The previous key recovery attacks against Helix obtain the key with about 2 88 operations using chosen nonces (reusing nonce) and about 1000 adaptively chosen plaintext words (or 2 35.6 chosen plaintext words). The stream cipher Phelix is the strengthened version of Helix. In this paper we apply the differential-linear cryptanalysis to recover the key of Phelix. With 2 34 chosen nonces and 2 37 chosen plaintext words, the key of Phelix can be recovered with about 2 41.5 operations.
Introduction
Phelix [5] is a fast stream cipher with embedded authentication mechanism. It is one of the focus ciphers (both software and hardware) of the ECRYPT eSTREAM project. Phelix is the strengthened version of the stream cipher Helix [1] .
Muller has applied differential cryptanalysis to Helix [2] . It was shown that the key of Helix can be recovered faster than by brute force if the attacker can force the initialization vectors to be used more than once. The attack requires about 2 12 adaptively chosen plaintext words and 2 88 operations. Paul and Preneel reduced the number of adaptively chosen plaintext words by a factor of at least 3 [4] . Later Paul and Preneel showed that 2 35.6 chosen plaintext words can be used instead of the adaptively chosen plaintext [3] . All these key recovery attacks against Helix require about 2 88 computations.
To strengthen Helix, Phelix was designed and submitted to the ECRYPT eSTREAM project. The output function of Helix has been changed so that a larger plaintext diffusion can be achieved in Phelix. The Phelix designers claimed that Phelix is able to resist the differential key recover attack even if the nonce is reused: "We claim, however, that even in such a case (referring to nonce reuse) it remains infeasible to recover the key" [5] .
In this paper, we apply differential-linear cryptanalysis to Phelix assuming nonce reuse (this corresponds to a chosen nonce attack). We show that the key of Phelix can be recovered with a low complexity: 2 37 chosen plaintext words and 2 41.5 operations. This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we illustrate the operations of Phelix. Section 3 analyzes how the addend bits affect the differential distribution. Section 4 describes a basic differential key recovery attack on Phelix. The improved attack is given in Sect. 5. We discuss how to strengthen Phelix in Sect. 6. Section 7 concludes this paper. 2 The Stream Cipher Phelix [5] In this section, we only consider the encryption algorithm of Phelix. The full description of Phelix is given in [5] . The key size and nonce size of Phelix are 256 bits and 128 bits, respectively. The designers claim that there is no attack against Phelix with less than 2 128 operations.
Phelix updates fives 32-bit words: Z 0 , Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3 and Z 4 . At the ith step, two secret 32-bit words X i,0 , X i,1 and one 32-bit plaintext word P i are applied to update the internal states. One 32-bit keystream word S i is generated and is used to encrypt the plaintext P i . Note that the plaintext is used to update the internal state so that the authentication can be performed. The word X i,0 is related to the key, and the word X i,1 is related to the key and nonce in a very simple way. Recovering any X i,0 and X i,1 implies recovering part of the key. One step of Phelix is given in Fig. 1 .
The Differential Propagation of Addition
In this section, we study how the addend bits affect the differential propagation. The importance of this study is that it shows that the values of the addend bits can be determined by observing the differential distribution of the sum. Theorem 1. Denote φ i as the ith least significant bit of φ. Suppose two positive m-bit integers φ and φ differ only at the nth least significant bit position (φ ⊕ φ = 2 n ). Let β be an m-bit random integer (m is much larger than n). Let ψ = φ + β and ψ = φ + β. For β n = 0, denote the probability that ψ n+i = ψ n+i as p n+i,0 . For β n = 1, denote the probability that ψ n+i = ψ n+i as p n+i,1 . Then the difference ∆p n+i = p n+i,0 − p n+i,1 = 2 −n−i+1 (i > 0). Theorem 1 can be proved easily if we consider the bias in the carry bits. We omit the proof here. In Theorem 1, the bias of the differential distribution decreases quickly as the value of n increases. We need another differential property that produces difference with a large bias even for large n. Before introducing that property, we give the following lemma from [6] . Lemma 1. Denote u and v as two random and independent n-bit integers. Let c n = (u + v) > > n, where c n denotes the carry bit at the nth least significant bit position. Denote the most significant bit of u as u n−1 . Then Pr(c n ⊕ u n−1 = 0) = 3 4 . Fig. 1 . One block of Phelix [5] The large bias of the differential distribution for large n is given below.
Theorem 2. Denote φ i as the ith least significant bit of φ. Suppose two positive m-bit integers φ and φ differ only at the nth least significant bit position (φ ⊕ φ = 2 n ). Let β be an m-bit random integer (m is much larger than n).
Let ψ = φ + β and ψ = φ + β. For β n ⊕ β n−1 = 0, denote the probability that ψ n+i = ψ n+i asp n+i,0 . For β n ⊕ β n−1 = 1, denote the probability that ψ n+i = ψ n+i asp n+i,1 . Then the difference ∆p n+i =p n+i,0 −p n+i,1 = 2 −i (i > 0).
Proof. Denote the carry bit at the ith least significant bit position in ψ = φ + β as c i , and that in ψ = φ + β as c i . Note that c n = c n , thus c n ⊕ β n = c n ⊕ β n . When c n ⊕ β n = c n ⊕ β n = 0, we know that ψ ⊕ ψ = 2 n with probility 1, i.e., ψ n+i = ψ n+i with probability 1 for i > 0. When c n ⊕β n = c n ⊕β n = 1, by induction we obtain that ψ n+i = ψ n+i with probability 1 − 2 −i+1 for i > 0. According to Lemma 1, we know that c n ⊕ β n−1 = 0 with probability 3 4 . If β n ⊕ β n−1 = 0, then c n ⊕ β n = 0 with probability 3 4 , thusp n+i,0 = 3
The above two theorems provide the guidelines to recover the key of Phelix. However, these two theorems deal with the ideal cases in which there is only one bit difference between φ and φ , and β is assumed to be random. In the attacks, we deal with the complicated situation where each bit of φ ⊕ φ is biased, and β is a fixed number. The value of each bit of β will affect the distribution of those more significant bits of (φ + β) ⊕ (φ + β) in a complicated way. In order to simplify the analysis, we will use simulations to obtain these relations in the attacks.
A Basic Key Recovery Attack on Phelix
We will first investigate the differential propagation in Phelix. Then we show how to recover the key of Phelix by observing the differential distribution of the keystream.
The bias in the differential distribution of the keystream
Assume an attacker can choose an arbitrary value for the nonce, then a nonce can be used more than once. We introduce one-bit difference into the plaintext at the ith step, i.e., P i = P i , and P i ⊕P i = 2 n (31 ≥ n ≥ 0). Then we analyze the difference between B (as indicated in Fig. 1 ). If all the carry bits are 0 (replacing all the additions with XORs), then the differences only appear at the 9th, 11th, 13th, 15th and 17th least significant bits between B . Because of the carry bits, the differential distribution becomes complicated. We run the simulation and use the randomly generated Y
in Table 1 . From Table 1 , we see that the distribution of B 9 3 with probability close to 0. Note that T
will be affected by the value of X 8 i+1,0 ⊕ X 9 i+1,0 , thus the distribution of B i+1 ⊕ B i+1 will be affected by the value of X 8 i,0 ⊕ X 9 i,0 . By observing the distribution of S i+1 ⊕ S i+1 , it may be possible to determine the value of X 8 i,0 ⊕ X 9 i,0 . Shifting the one-bit difference between P i and P i , we may determine other values of X j+1 i,0 ⊕ X j i,0 for 30 ≥ j ≥ 0, thus recover the key X i,0 . After recovering eight consequtive X i,0 , the 256-bit key is immediately known.
The above analysis gives a brief idea of the attack. However, the actual attacks are quite complicated due to the interference of many differences. It is very tedious to derive exactly how the distribution of S i+1 ⊕ S i+1 is affected by the value of X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 . On the other hand, it is easy to search for the relation with simulations. In the following, we carried out the simulation to find out the relation between the value of X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 and the distribution of
Let two plaintexts differ only in the ith word, and P i ⊕ P i = 1. We use the randomly generated Y
in the simulation. Denote p n j,0 as the probability that S n i+1 ⊕ S n i+1 = 0 when X j+1 i,0 ⊕ X j i,0 = 0. And denote p n j,1 as the probability that S n i+1 ⊕ S n i+1 = 0 when X j+1
where N denotes the number of plaintext pairs, and σ = √ N 2 . Assume that the values of p n j,0 and p n j,1 are close to 1 2 . If ∆p n j > 4, it means that the difference between p n j,0 and p n j,1 is larger than 4σ, then the value of X j+1 i,0 ⊕X j i,0 can be determined correctly with high probability. For every value of the two bits X j+1 i,0 and X j i,0 , we use 2 28 pairs to generate S i+1 ⊕ S i+1 , then compute p n j,0 and p n j,1 . Thus N = 2 29 , and σ = 2 13.5 . We list the large values of ∆p n j below:
For j = 9, ∆p 13 9 = 55.7 .
For j = 10, ∆p 13 10 = 133.9 . For j = 14, ∆p 17 14 = 51. The data given above show that the distribution of S i+1 ⊕ S i+1 is strongly affected by the value of X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 .
Recovering the key
Note that in the above analysis, when we deal with a particular X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 , the other bits of X i+1,0 are random. In the key recovery attack, the value of X i+1,0 is fixed, so we need to consider the interference between the bits X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 .
We notice that there are many large biases related to S 23 We used the Phelix C source code submitted to eSTREAM in the experiments. However, there is a bug in the C source code. The output is given as
which is specified in the paper. The Phelix C code with the bug being fixed was used in the experiments. Experiment 1. The experiment is to recover the value of X 15 1,0 ⊕ X 14 1,0 . Each plaintext has two words P 0 and P 1 . For each plaintext pair, the two words differ only in the least significant bit of P 0 . N plaintext pairs are used for each key to determine the value of X 15 1,0 ⊕ X 14 1,0 as follows: if the fraction of cases for which S 17 1 ⊕ S 17 1 = 0 is larger thanp 17 14 = 0.50172, then the value of X 15 1,0 ⊕ X 14 1,0 is considered to be 0; otherwise the value of X 15 1,0 ⊕ X 14 1,0 is considered to be 1. A random nonce was used for each plaintext pair. We tested 200 keys in the experiment. For N = 2 22.3 , the values of X 15 1,0 ⊕ X 14 1,0 of 183 keys are determined correctly. For N = 2 25 , the values of X 15 1,0 ⊕ X 14 1,0 of 192 keys are determined correctly.
Experiment 1 shows that the value of X 15 1,0 ⊕ X 14 1,0 can be determined successfully by introducing a difference in the least significant bit of P 0 , but with a higher error rate. The reason is that other bits of X 1,0 affects the determination of X 15 1,0 ⊕ X 14 1,0 in a subtle way. We now proceed to recover the other bits of X 1,0 . By rotating the onebit difference between P 0 and P 0 , and using the same threshold value, we can determine the value of X j+1 1,0 ⊕ X j 1,0 for 2 ≤ j ≤ 3, 5 ≤ j ≤ 10 and 14 ≤ j ≤ 28. Thus we are able to recover 23 bits of information on each X i,0 . For the 256-bit key of Phelix, we are able to recover 23 × 8 = 184 bits of the key with success rate about 192 200 = 0.96 . The amount of plaintext pairs required in the attack is about 2 25 × 32 × 8 = 2 33 . We need to improve the above attack in two approaches: recovering more key bits and improving the success rate. The direct approach is to adjust the threshold value for each key bit position. In the following, we illustrate a more advanced approach which recovers the values of Z (i) 4 before recovering the key.
Improving the Attack on Phelix
In the above attack, we use a random nonce for each plaintext pair, i.e., every nonce is used twice with the same key. When the nonce is used many times with the same key, we can introduce the difference at P i and recover the value of Z i−3 4 by observing the distribution of S i+1 ⊕ S i+1 . Then we proceed to recover X i+1,0 .
Recovering Z (i) 4
We introduce the difference to the least significant bit of P i (P i ⊕ P i = 1). A simulation is carried out to determine the distribution of Y
. We use the randomly generated Y
Denoteṗ n as the probability that Y (i+1),n 4 ⊕ Y (i+1),n 4 = 0. With 2 30 pairs, we obtain the values ofṗ n in Table 2 . 2 4 with probability about 0.70291, while Y (i+1), 3 4 = Y (i+1), 3 4 with probability about 0.22246. 2 4 . Next we carry out simulations to characterize this relation. We use the randomly generated Y
in the simulation. The one-bit difference is introduced to P i , i.e., P i ⊕ P i = 2 j . Denotep n j,0 as the probability that S n i+1 ⊕S n i+1 = 0 when Z
And denotep n j,1 as the probability that S n i+1 ⊕ S n i+1 = 0 when Z , we use 2 28 plaintext pairs. We find thatp 5 2,0 = 0.5461 andp 5 2,1 = 0.5193. The large difference between p 5 2,0 andp 5 2,1 shows that the value of Z (i−3), 3 4 ⊕ Z (i−3),2 4 can be determined with success rate 0.999 with about 2 13.9 plaintext pairs (The cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution gives value 0.999 at the point 3.1σ).
The above approach is able to recover Z (0) 4 , but the success rate is not that high according to our experiment. In the following, we use a new approach to determine Z first, then proceed to recover the more significant bits bit-by-bit.
We start with determining the value of Z . Each plaintext has five random words P i (0 ≤ i ≤ 4). For each plaintext pair, the dif-ference is only in the least significant bit of P 3 . N plaintext pairs are used for each key/nonce pair to determine the value of Z (0),0 as follows: if the rate that = Z (i−3) mod 2 n . Let the difference be introduced to the kth least significant bit of P i , i.e., P i ⊕ P i = 2 k . Denotep k,j,0
as the probability that the value of the jth bit of (S i+1 − Z
as the probability that the value of the jth bit of (S i+1 −Z
Let P i ⊕ P i = 2. We use 2 28 plaintext pairs in the simulation. We found that is determined to be 1. We need about 2 11.3 plaintext pairs to determine the value of Z (i−3), 1 4 correctly with success rate 0.999. Using the Phelix code in the experiment, we tested 1000 random key/nonce pairs satisfying Z (0),0 4 = 0, and 2 12 plaintext pairs are used for each key/nonce pair with the difference P 3 ⊕ P 3 = 2. We found that all the 1000 values of Z (0), 1 4 are determined correctly. If Z (i−3),0 4 = 1, we observe the third least significant bit of (S i+1 − 1) ⊕ (S i+1 − 1), and we can determine the value of Z (0), 1 4 = 0 with success rate 0.999 with about 2 11.3 plaintext pairs. Let P i ⊕ P i = 2 2 , we are able to determine the value of Z (i−3), 2 4 by observing the fourth least significant bit of (S i+1 − Z
). In general, let P i ⊕ P i = 2 j , then we are able to determine the value of Z (i−3),j 4 by observing the (j + 2)th least significant bit of (S i+1 − Z
) with about 2 12 plaintext pairs. Thus we are able to recover Z ), we know the value of (S i+1 − Z
). Thus we know the value of Y (i+1),j ⊕ Y (i+1),j (0 ≤ j ≤ 30). Then we are able to recover X i+1,0 more efficiently.
Let two plaintexts differ only in the ith word. And let P i ⊕P i = 1. We use the randomly generated Y
in the simulation. For every value of the two bits X j+1 i,0 and X j i,0 , we use 2 28 plaintext pairs to generate Y
, then compute p n j,0 and p n j,
is known). Thus N = 2 29 , and σ = 2 13.5 . We list the following two large biases ∆p n j :
For j = 9, ∆p 13 9 = 144.1 For j = 10, ∆p 13 10 = 362.12
We use ∆p 13 9 and ∆p 13 10 in the attack. Note that the values of X 10 i+1,0 ⊕ X 9 i+1,0
. We carried out a simulation to determine how the value of X 9 i+1,0 affects the value of Y (i+1), 13 4 . With 2 30 chosen plaintext pairs, if X 9 i+1,0 = 0, then p 13 0,00 = 0.53033, p 13 0,11 = 0.52334, p 13 0,01 = 0.51946, p 13 0,10 = 0.51864; if X 9 i+1,0 = 1, then p 13 0,00 = 0.52334, p 13 0,11 = 0.53030, p 13 0,01 = 0.51861, p 13 0,10 = 0.51948. We thus let p 13 0,0 = 0.52334, and p 13 0,1 = 0.51946+0.51948 2 = 0.51947. About 2 19.3 plaintext pairs are required to determine the value of X 11 i+1,0 ⊕ X 10 i+1,0 with success rate 0.999. is known. This experiment is to determine the value of X 11 4,0 ⊕ X 10 4,0 . Each plaintext has five random words P i (0 ≤ i ≤ 4). For each plaintext pair, those five words differ only in the least significant bit of P 3 . N plaintext pairs are used for each key/nonce pair to determine the value of X 11 4,0 ⊕ X 10 4,0 as follows: if the rate that Y 13 4 ⊕ Y 13 4 = 0 is larger than 0.52334+0.51947 2 = 0.52140, then the value of X 11 4,0 ⊕ X 10 4,0 is considered to be 0; otherwise the value of X 11 4,0 ⊕ X 10 4,0 is considered to be 1. We tested 1000 key/nonce pairs in the experiment. For N = 2 19.3 , 948 values of 1000 X 11 4,0 ⊕ X 10 4,0 are determined correctly. We change the threshold value 0.52140 to 0.52035, then 970 values of 1000 X 11 4,0 ⊕ X 10 4,0 are determined correctly for N = 2 20 , 976 values are determined correctly for N = 2 21 , 990 values are determined correctly for N = 2 22 . Experiment 3 shows that the value of X 11 4,0 ⊕ X 10 4,0 can be determined successfully by introducing difference to the least significant bit of P 3 . With 2 22 chosen pairs, we are able to determine the value of X 11 4,0 ⊕ X 10 4,0 with success rate about 0.99.
Then we shift the one-bit difference to recover the values of X j+1 1,0 ⊕ X j 1,0 for 2 ≤ j ≤ 28. The threshold value need to be modified for different value of j. The results are given in Table 3 in Appendix A. Note that according to Experiment 3, the threshold values should be slightly adjusted to achieve high success rate.
The reason that the values of X j+1 4,0 ⊕ X j 4,0 cannot be recovered for j ≥ 29 is that the value of X j+1 1,0 ⊕ X j 1,0 cannot affect the distribution of S j+3
The reason that the number of plaintext required for j = 9 is relatively small is that the difference for j = 13 is introduced to the most significant bit of the word P 3 , thus it causes less difference propagation, and results in larger bias in the keystream. Note that the most significant bit of Y
is not known since are not recovered. Thus to determine the value of X 29 1,0 ⊕X 28 1,0 , we need to consider the most significant bit of (S i+1 − Z
). The threshold value needs to be changed to 0.51128; and the number of plaintext pairs required is 2 22.1 .
After recovering the values of X j+1 1,0 ⊕ X j 1,0 for 2 ≤ j ≤ 28, we proceed to determine the value of X 0 i+1,0 , X 1 i+1,0 and X 2 i+1,0 . We start with recovering X 0 i+1,0 . Let P i ⊕ P i = 2 21 . Running the simulation with 2 28 plaintext pairs, we found that p 2 21,0 = 0.51596, p 2 21,1 = 0.50355. Thus 2 15.93 plaintext pairs are needed to determine the value of X 0 i+1,0 with success rate 0.999. Using the Phelix code in the experiement, we introduce the difference P 3 ⊕P 3 = 2 21 , and set the threshold value as 0.51596+0.50355 2 = 0.50975. We tested 1000 key/nonce pairs in the experiment. With 2 16 plaintext pairs, all the values of the 1000 X 0 4,0 are determined correctly. After determine the value of X 0 i+1,0 , we determine the value of X 1 i+1,0 as follows. The simulation shows that the value of X 1 i+1,0 can be determined only when X 0 i+1,0 = 0. For X 0 i+1,0 = 0, we set the difference as P i ⊕P i = 2 22 . With 2 28 chosen plaintext pairs, we found that if X 1 i+1,0 = 0, then Y (i+1), 3 4 = 0 with rate 0.51528; otherwise Y (i+1), 3 4 = 0 with rate 0.50459. With 2 16.4 plaintext pairs, the value of X 1 i+1,0 can be determined with success rate 0.999. Using the Phelix code in the experiement, we introduce the difference P 3 ⊕ P 3 = 2 22 , and set the threshold value as 0.51528+0.50459 2 = 0.50994. We tested 1000 key/nonce pairs with X 0 4,0 = 0 in the experiment. With 2 16.4 plaintext pairs, all the values of the 1000 X 1 4,0 are determined correctly. It shows that the value of X 1 i+1,0 can be determined successfully if X 0 4,0 = 0. We continue to recover the value of X 2 i+1,0 . We introduce difference to the 15th least significant bit of P i , and oberve the distribution of Y (i−3), 4 4 . We carry out a simulation with 2 31 plaintext pairs with P 3 ⊕ P 3 = 2 15 . 2 31 plaintext pairs are used for each value of 4 4 = 0 for X 2 i+1,0 = 0 and X 2 i+1,0 = 1 are 0.53106 and 0.52613, respectively; if X 1 i+1,0 = 1, the rates that Y (i−3), 4 4 = 0 for X 2 i+1,0 = 0 and X 2 i+1,0 = 1 are 0.52318 and 0.52315, respectively. It shows that the value X 2 i+1,0
can only be determined if the values of X 1 i+1,0 and X 1 i+1,0 are both zero, and 2 18.6 plaintext pairs are required to achieve the success rate 0.999.
In the above attacks, we recovered 28.75 bits of X i+1,0 : X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 for 2 ≤ j ≤ 28, X 0 i+1,0 , X 1 i+1,0 (only if X 0 i+1,0 = 0), and X 1 i+1,0 (only if X 0 i+1,0 = 0 and X 1 i+1,0 = 0). 27 bits of X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 (2 ≤ j ≤ 28) can be determined according to Table 3 . From Experiment 3, we know that if we adjust slightly the threshold value, and use about 2 2.7 times the number of plaintext pairs than that given in Table 3 , the success rate is about 0.99. The number of plaintext pairs required to determine these 27 bits is thus about 27 × 2 22.2 × 2 2.7 = 2 29.7 . The number of plaintext pairs to determine X 0 i+1,0 , X 1 i+1,0 and X 2 i+1,0 is small comparing to 2 29.7 . The attack to recover 28.75 bits of X i+1,0 requires thus about 2 32.7 chosen plaintext pairs.
After recovering eight consecutive X i+1,0 , we recovered 28.75 × 8 = 230 key bits. To recover the 256-bit key, the amount of operations required is about is about 2 17 × 8 = 2 25 . It is small comparing to 2 32.7 ).
How to strengthen Helix and Phelix
In Helix and Phelix, the plaintext is used to affect the internal state of the cipher. In order to achieve a high encryption speed, each plaintext word affects the keystream without passing through sufficient confusion and diffusion layers. This is the intrinsic weakness in the structure of Helix and Phelix. In the following, we provide a method to reduce the effect of such weakness.
The security of the encryption of Helix and Phelix can be improved significantly if a secure one-way function is used to generate the initial state of the cipher from the key and nonce. Then even if the internal state of one particular nonce is recovered, the impact on the security of the encryption is very limited since the key of the cipher is not affected. We believe that such an approach can be applied to improve the security of all the ciphers that use the plaintext to affect the internal state.
However, we must point out that such an approach does not improve significantly the security of the MAC in Helix and Phelix. Once an internal state is recovered, the attacker can forge many messages related to that particular nonce.
Conclusion
Phelix is vulnerable to a key recovery attack when chosen nonces and chosen plaintexts are used. The computational complexity of the attack is much less than that of the attack against Helix. Our attack shows that Phelix fails to strengthen Helix in this respect.
We believe that one necessary requirement for a secure general-purpose stream cipher is that the key of the cipher should not be recoverable even if the attacker can control the generation of the nonce. We thus consider Phelix as insecure. Note that Muller has pointed out the impact of the key recovery attack on the security of Helix in detail [2] . The same comments apply to Phelix.
A The complexity to recover X i+1,0 with the known Z (i−3) 4
The number of plaintext pairs and the threshold value required to recover the value of each X j+1 i+1,0 ⊕ X j i+1,0 (2 ≤ j ≤ 28) are given in Table 3 . Each value n in the second column indicates that the difference is introduced in the nth least significant bit of P i . Each value n in the third column shows that the nth least significant bit of Y (i+1) 4 is used in the attack. 
